Theoretical and historical experience suggests a financial centre may either include a single, consolidated and loosely regulated stock exchange attracting all intermediaries and actors, or a variety of exchanges going from strictly regulated to completely unregulated and adapted to the needs of different categories of intermediaries, investors and issuers. Choosing between these two solutions is uneasy because few substantial changes occur at this "meta-regulatory" level. The history of the Paris exchanges provides a good example, since two changes in opposite directions occurred in the late 19 th century, when Paris was the second financial centre in the world. In 1893, a law threatened the existing two-exchanges equilibrium by diminishing the advantages of the more regulated exchange; in 1898, another law brought them back. We analyse the impact of these two changes on the competition between the exchanges in terms of securities listed, traded volumes and spreads. We conclude competition among exchanges is a delicate matter and efficiency is not always where one would think.
Introduction
The debate on the virtues of fragmentation vs consolidation of securities markets has recently been reopened by the Mifid directive of the European Union and its revision. In some European countries, like Italy and France, regulated markets were protected against internal competition by rules imposing the concentration of orders on listed securities, even if they competed with other international markets. The implementation of Mifid on November 1st, 2007 allowed the entry of new competitors in the stock exchange industry: MTF, systematic internalizers, crossing networks, dark pools. This was well in line with the idea dominating Mifid that the contestability of the market would allow both a substantial decrease of transaction costs and an important increase in transparency, when also stimulating the integration of the European securities market.
Nevertheless, the effects of Mifid as observed two years later don't correspond entirely with the Commission's expectations. The complex nature of transaction costs on stock exchanges -indirect costs related to multidimensional liquidity (tightness, deepness, immediacy) and information in particular -make them difficult to evaluate, and suggest the association of deregulation and the decrease of costs may be less obvious than previously considered.
The literature on the microstructures of securities markets often emphasized the benefits of a consolidated market for both investors and issuers, considering such a consolidation as the natural consequence of the competition between markets. The benefits of consolidation result from positive externalities of liquidity, from the diversification of risks and investment opportunities, and the reduction in information asymmetries resulting from the consolidation of the price discovery process. The organization of securities exchanges involving important fixed costs, the consolidation in one market, together with the competition among brokers, is supposed to decrease transaction costs.
Following the bonding hypothesis, investors and issuers should concentrate on a unique highly transparent market with strict listing and disclosure requirements. For issuers, this solution allows sending a signal on the quality of their governance. It protects uninformed investors against those better informed and screaming the market. Even informed investors would prefer concentrating on a market with the high liquidity resulting from the presence of uninformed investors (Coffee 2002 ).
In the opposite direction, a more recent literature emphasizes the obstacles to such a consolidation, and the advantages of a fragmented market if investors and issuers are heterogeneous enough in terms of risk aversion, information, costs structure and patience. For example, informed investors (and the CEOs of some firms) may prefer an opaque market where they can take advantage of their superior information, when uninformed investors may opt for a transparent and less immediate market; a variety of markets may emerge, where different categories of actors could find the characteristics they prefer (e.g. Seppi 1997 ). In terms of the bonding hypothesis, fragmentation may also result from the capacity constraints that a highly transparent market with strict listing conditions would face. Such a market must restrict access to a select group of brokers in order to limit counterparty risk, something which reduces the number of available counterparties and limits the market's capacity to treat a high number of transactions. Such a market must select firms on strict criteria, something which, especially during new technology booms, may restrict the access of emerging firms which will search for another market for their shares (Coffee 2002 ).
Hence, if there is a consensus on the inefficiencies that would result from the juxtaposition of various identical markets, serious arguments suggest that the co-existence of different markets may help the development of the securities market as a whole. In equilibrium, the transaction costs in such markets would differ profoundly in their structure. If one considers transaction costs as including not only commissions but also liquidity and uncertainty, one would expect commissions to be lower, liquidity to be higher and uncertainty to be larger in less regulated markets. Among the various dimensions of liquidity, immediacy would be the dominant one in such a market thanks to the presence of large informed traders aiming at taking profit from their information in a relatively opaque market (Pagano and Roell 1996) ; on the other hand, relatively high spreads could result from inventory costs and, mainly, from the risks intermediaries face when trading with highly informed agents , Hasbrouck 1988 , Madhavan and Smith 1991 . In order to manage uncertainty, a regulated market could reduce risks by both its organizational structure (i.e. efficient settlement and delivery) and the guarantees it offers (i.e. central counterpart) (Duffy and Zhu 2009 , Bernanke 1990 and Kroszner (1999 , 2006 .
Recent research on the history of stock exchanges confirmed that some financial centres could develop successfully not only when, as London, they included a single, open, stock exchange, but also when, as New-York and Paris, they included various exchanges (White, 2008; Hautcoeur and Riva, 2009) . From the early 19 th c. onwards, the structure of the Parisian stock market was bipolar, including two very different markets, the Parquet and the Coulisse. The Parquet was the official market organized by the Compagnie des agents de change (CAC), the semi-private body of 60 official brokers (agents de change) with a legal monopoly on transactions. These brokers were recruited on strict social and wealth conditions which provided high guarantees to the investors (see Hautcoeur and Riva 2009 for an estimate of these guarantees). The official market was highly transparent, imposed strict listing conditions, and provided investors with a collective guarantee which made losses unlikely in the case of the default of a member. It controlled strictly its members 3 . It also provided efficient payment and settlement mechanisms in cooperation with the Bank of France.
By contrast, the Coulisse was a loosely organized market (with no juridical structure until 1884), illegal de jure but de facto tolerated and even protected by the government. Its members acted both as brokers and jobbers. They were usually less wealthy than the official brokers. Their number was not fixed, and the admission procedure was loose. The Coulisse was opaque: orders were not centralised, transaction prices were registered unsystematically, and published by newspapers without any guarantee for investors, in variable lists.
Competition among coulissiers was not regulated and transactions were only guaranteed by their capital and individual wealth that on average was lower than the agents de change' one 4 .
The differences between the two markets led to a specialization, competition developing only at the margin. The coulisse mostly dealt in forward and option operations, when the Parquet had a de facto quasi-monopoly on spot transactions. The Coulisse listed many (mostly foreign) issuers that did not satisfy the listing requirements of the Parquet (including some fiscal requirements). Competition between the two markets concerned mostly the most liquid, hence cross-listed, foreign and French government bonds, those on which 3 On the counterparty risk management by the Parquet, see Riva-White 2009. 4 We have no data on the personal wealth of the coulissiers, but historical research shows that they belong to a social class lower than the Agents de change (Verley 2007 and 2010, forthcoming) . Concerning the firms' capital, we have detailed data on the Agents de changes' one, but not on the coulissiers' "houses". The patente (a tax on the value of commercial real estates owned by merchants) is the best available proxy for comparing the two groups: on average, an agent de change paid five times the amount paid by a coulissiers in 1893 (Administration des contributions directes. Département de la Seine. Rapport du Directeur, Paris le 3/1/1893. Tab. N° 1 Contribution des patentes -Agents de change, 4/1/1893 et Tab. N° 2 Contribution des patentes -Tenant caisse ou comptoir d'opérations sur valeurs, 4/1/1893. box B 33.236 CAEF). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the total amount paid by the coulissiers was equal to the one paid by the agents de change. most of the speculative activity was concentrated (Vidal 1904) 5 ; from 1890 on, it also involved a number of mid-cap French firms listed on the two exchanges. Individual investors mostly sent their orders to the Parquet, when professional investors split their orders between the two markets.
This bipolar architecture remained quite steady over the century, suffering only one severe threat in the late 1850s, when the Parquet attempted (and failed) taking over the Coulisse. In the following decades, the Coulisse developed steadily. In the 1890s, the bipolar architecture was discussed and tested, the Paris market becoming the place for two experiments in microstructures that are the subject of this paper. In 1893, the creation of a new tax gave to the Coulisse a legal status, de facto dismantling the monopoly of the Parquet
and creating an open field for new entrants in the exchange business. In 1898, a new (tax) law took the opposite route and re-established the monopoly of official brokers on all transactions in the securities they listed.
We first present an historical account of the suppression and reestablishment of the Parquet's monopoly, presenting the different arguments that were used and the main reasons one can propose in order to understand these two important changes. We then try to assess their impact on the market by looking first at quantities traded and at the two markets' quality as measured by the spreads on listed securities.
History
The 1893 reform
In 1892, a tax on stock market transactions was proposed by the socialist member of the Chamber of Deputies Antoine Jourde not only as a sanction for the various financial crises and scandals of the previous decade (among which the Panama canal corruption scandal led to the resignation of the finance minister on December 13 th 1892, just one day after Jourde's proposal was approved by the Chamber), but also as a statistical instrument allowing the government to observe the operations on the stock market (see his speech at the Parliament on 5 During the XIX century, speculative activity concentrated on large international issues of public bonds cross-listed on the main European exchanges, not on stocks. Vidal (1904) explains that speculators dealt on this kind of securities because (i) the issues were very large; (ii) the probability of default was limited relatively to other securities; (iii) coupons insured stable and foreseeable revenues; (iv) prices' variations were not correlated to either local or seasonal factors. Dec. 13 th , 1895 and the introduction to the bill 6 ).
The Coulisse and the Parquet brokers fought against the tax that would in their vision harm Paris as international financial centre. Nevertheless, each group rapidly turned to consider the tax as an opportunity for obtaining a favourable settlement in the conflict that opposed them: "they differed only on the application process, which, for both of them, was crucial" 7 . The tax created a dilemma for the government because of the structure of the Paris stock market: if it was to be imposed only to the Parquet, it would kill it, since all operations would migrate to the tax exempted Coulisse; but if imposed to the Coulisse too on equal bases, it would legalize it, and badly damage the Parquet which would suffer from its heavier regulatory burden without the advantage of a superior legal position. Nevertheless, the interactions among professional groups and regulators helped the latter to solve the dilemma.
The Finance Minister Pierre Tirard presented a bill in January which reinforced the official brokers' monopoly, since it made their signature necessary for the payment of the tax on listed securities. In fact, the Parquet had started lobbying the government very soon. The budget commission of the Chamber of Deputies, of which the Coulisse's advisor 
Reasons for the reform
If one aims understanding the reasons for the 1893 reform, it is necessary to take some Minister. Some personal conflicts with Tirard could also explain his position vis à vis the project of the latter: Peytral had been Finance Minister just before Tirard and the latter had rejected every work in progress of his predecessor. 27 Peytral had to support the consequences of a decrease in the tax on alcoholised drinks, which he actually originated (in order to decrease the importance of indirect taxation) distance from the immediate debates and to take a broad perspective on the Paris stock market. The reasons for the reform can be organized in three groups: the role and efficiency of the Coulisse; the interests of the banks; and those of the State.
The Coulisse had developed rapidly in the period before the law, and put the Parquet in a defensive position. Taking advantage of the 1884 law legalizing unions (a law proposed by the Coulisse's advisor Waldeck-Rousseau), the Coulisse had organized as a union (which meant no solidarity among its members), which allowed it to organize more efficiently, particularly the settlement and delivery system, which had been run earlier on a bilateral basis.
Various regulatory changes were responsible for much of these changes. First, the 1882 crash had led in 1885 to the legalization of the forward market, which benefited more the Coulisse than the Parquet: not only because it mostly operated on the forward market, but also because the Parquet's forward operations already benefited before the law from a quasisystematic enforcement by the courts (mainly because of both the Parquet collective guarantee to the forward market operators and its strict trading rules 28 ), which were more reluctant towards the Coulisse. Second, an 1885 decision by the Cassation court also reduced the uncertainty that coulissiers faced, by stating that a coulissier was a valid broker for a trade in securities not listed on the Parquet 29 . From then on, a list of securities tradable outside the Parquet was published yearly: it included 202 securities in 1892 30 . Third, the 1890 new legal regulation of the Parquet reinforced its security, but increased its regulatory burden and then decreased its competitiveness.
The banks formed a group increasingly supportive of the Coulisse. First because part of the advantages of trading on the Parquet have been lost to them because of an unsuccessful strategic move of the official brokers: after the 1882 crash, which had led to 14 defaults among these brokers, the Parquet, after paying for all the losses as their internal rules guaranteed to their clients, had considered its internal controls as unable to prevent free-riding within the Parquet, and decided to pay only for the debts they were legally constrained to guarantee. This led some of their clients -mostly bankers -to lose money when two official brokers went bankrupt in the 1886 (Vuaflart) and 1888 (Bex), events that the coulissiers highlighted in their campaign 31 . This was maybe efficient in terms of the Parquet internal incentive system, but tarnished heavily its reputation, and made the banks increasingly favourable to the Coulisse.
More importantly, the banks had common interests with the Coulisse 32 . The deposit banks provided the huge amounts of short-term credit that was required by the forward market 33 . The merchant banks were important clients of the Coulisse since they appreciated the immediacy it alone could provide, as well as the opaqueness that allowed them to take advantage of their superior information. All banks wanted the market to be liberalized since it would allow them to internalize many of their clients' orders without risk 34 , and to use the intermediation of the coulissiers without any legal uncertainty 35 . This new architecture would have allowed banks to put the official brokers in competition with the coulissiers and to decrease the intermediation costs 36 . Thanks to the dual capacity, the coulissiers already centre, when the reinforcement of the Parquet monopoly would destroy it.
The last party interested in the debate was the State. Its interest had various dimensions. The fiscal dimension opened the debate and was certainly not negligible.
Nevertheless, the impact of a given choice on stock market operations was not clear, so that the Coulisse argument was not very strong. The impact of a blow to the Coulisse on the trading of French rentes was a more serious preoccupation, since most of that trading was done on the Coulisse; a rentes conversion was considered for January 1894, which bankers and coulissiers pretended would fail if the Coulisse was weakened. The role of the Coulisse during the huge issues of rentes required in 1872-75 by the war indemnity paid to Germany was still in all minds. Precisely for this reason, the Finance Minister asked the agents de change for renouncing to sue the Coulisse as they planned after the 1893 bill passed.
The diplomatic dimension was also underscored: the Coulisse was the main market for various foreign government bonds, which listing in Paris was important for foreign relations. Finally, the population certainly appreciated the creation of a tax on financial operations, and would likely prefer a more regulated market, dominated by the Parquet, compared to a more deregulated one, dominated by the Coulisse. Creating a tax was nevertheless certainly sufficient to obtain a speculation-bashing reputation 37 .
The 1898 law
The 1893 reform, a result of a number of partially conflictive tensions, was reversed as soon as 1898. Another fiscal law then included the Fleury-Ravarin amendment, which imposed that the tax on officially listed securities could only be paid by the agents de change. On the positive side, a major reason for re-establishing the Parquet's dominant position was its return to its traditional policy of guaranteeing collectively the losses of its clients. The short-lived « anti-free-rider » policy which had been adopted in 1883 was disputed as soon as 1890, when Verneuil entered the Chambre syndicale, and strenghtened first when the Parquet faced the 1895 crash, second when Verneuil became syndic in 1896.
The aftermaths of the 1898 law
The 1898 law didn't bring the market back to its pre-1893 organization. First, the reaffirmation of the Parquet's dominance had a price: the Parquet had to reorganize strongly.
To a large extent, this was less the price of a monopoly than the requirement for the changes necessary in order to be able to handle a substantially increased number of transactions: the Parquet itself calculated that about 5/7 of the 70 billions of Coulisse transactions concerned securities listed on the Parquet, which would then be negotiated by the Parquet after 1898.
The number of agents de change was increased from 60 to 70 and the number of pits was doubled; the commissions were reduced so much that they became inferior to those in London and other foreign markets 44 ; the procedures for payment and settlement were reinforced and accelerated. An extension of the stock exchange building (the Palais Brongniart) was to be 42 A report by the Chairman of the Paris Commercial Court mentions several « frauds which repression was hindered by the insolvency of the offenders » (« fraudes sont l'insolvabilité des délinquants ne permettait pas la répression », Rapport de M. le Président du Tribunal de commerce de la Paris à MM. Les Présidents et Juges des Tribunaux de commerce de la Seine, May 14 th , 1898, CAEF, bow 64.895). 43 The head of the tax administration in charge explained that the only possible verification depended on the matching of the records of two intermediaries having done an operation together, which made it easy to escape for those acting as counterparty (letter "Le Directeur de l'Enregistrement au Ministre des Finances. Note Impôt sur les opérations de bourse. Observation de M Krantz », July, 2 nd , 1897 ; CAEF, B 34.010). 44 That very low level resulted both from a decrease (by half) of the legal maximum commission, and from the usual practice of commissions representing only about half the legal maximum. These "usual commissions" were the minimum that the Parquet itself tried to impose to its members in order to avoid excessive competition. The Crédit lyonnais calculated in 1906 for its own use a comparison of commissions on the major European markets, which mentioned the lowest rates for the Parquet. The same fact was considered a good reason for raising the tax on securities transactions without threatening the Paris market by the tax administration in 1906 (see « Note du Mouvement général des fonds au cabinet du Ministre (bureau des travaux législatifs), october 13, 1906, CAEF box B.64.877). Even the Paris Chamber of commerce, certainly not favourable to the Parquet monopoly, considered the commissions as low compared to the responsabilities that the agents de change beared (malgré « le principe du monopole qui n'eut peut-être pas prévalu dans vos avis (….) il est même évident que dans certains cas ce nouveau tarif fixe ce courtage à un taux peu en rapport avec la responsabilité qu'assume l'Agent » , rapport présenté au nom de la commission n°3 de la Chambre de commerce de Paris par M. Hugot, adopté et converti en délibération de la Chambre de commerce dans sa séance du 11 mai 1898, p. 2; CAEF, box B. 64.895). on some dimensions, this new architecture conferred more stability 47 to and does not affect the development of the Paris financial centre: it did maintain firmly its position of second larger world financial centre, a rank that could not be explained by the French real economy.
Quantitative tests
We aim at estimating the impact of the 1893 and 1898 regulatory changes in various dimensions: first, the impact on the development of the market; second on the market's quality.
The regulatory changes of 1893 and 1898 cannot be separated, as should be clear from the historical presentation above, from other changes in the microstructures of the two markets, so that we can only measure the impact of these broad, global changes, on the market development. Two polar arguments can be made, following either the contemporaries 
Listings
We constructed a list of securities which prices were published as "traded on the Coulisse" in the French securities, and decreased on foreign ones. Coulisse didn't suffer from1898 either: in 1900, the market share of the Parquet had increased, compared to 1894, only for foreign bonds (certainly the most contested market), but decreased for French stocks. Moreover, the Coulisse's list in 1900 included twice the number of securities that we counted for 1890. Nevertheless, it may be that the 1898 change is responsible for the decline of the Coulisse after 1900: the 12% decrease overall of the number of securities listed (almost 30% on foreign stocks) may well result from the growing interest of the Parquet for some segments (it more than doubled during that period the number of foreign stocks on its list), and from its legal capacity to exclude the Coulisse from them.
Transactions
The volumes of transactions are difficult to evaluate before the 1893 law. After that law, data on the payment of the tax provide some information. Nevertheless, the rates of the tax are lowered (by 75%) for the French rentes in 1895, and unfortunately the allocation of transactions between these rentes and other securities is unknown. This makes it difficult to compare the 1894-1895 years with the following ones. If we believe the estimation (provided by supporters of the Coulisse) of 75 billions francs of operations for the Coulisse in 1892 and 35 for the Parquet (then a 2.14 to 1 ratio), and compare it to the ratio of the tax paid by the two markets in 1894 (2.17 in favour of the Coulisse), the similarity is striking. It suggests that the Coulisse didn't benefit much, at least in the short term, from its new freedom 49 . On the other hand, the same ratio for 1903 was only 0.5. As graph 1 shows, the « market share » of the Coulisse dropped from 2/3d to 1/3d around the 1898 reform. In terms of timing, the Coulisse suffered a first drop in 1895, which may be attributed to the crash in the "gold mines" stocks. Graph 2 gives the amount of the tax paid on stock exchange transactions from 1893 onwards by brokers located in Paris (they represented around 96% of all tax payments in France). The 1896 drop results both from the "gold mines" crash of October 1895, and from the decrease in the tax rates. The point "1896 estimated" gives an estimate of the total tax that would have been paid in1896 had the tax rates remained the same. It suggests that around 60% of the decline resulted from the change in tax rates, the rest resulting from a decline in transactions.
Most importantly, graph 2 shows that total transactions didn't decline after 1898, contrary to the predictions of the Coulisse supporters. They may even have increased.
The internal stamp tax that the Parquet imposed to its members (in order to finance collective action and collective guarantee) provides us with more detailed information on the transactions on the Parquet 50 . If one considers more carefully the various segments of the market (see graphs in appendix 2), it is possible to note that the Parquet suffered no serious blow from the 1893 reform: even if its market share declined from mid-1894 up to the gold mines crash, it participated the boom of 1894-95 and the 1896 crisis, mostly on the forward market. The spot market wasn't much affected by the 1898 regulation, which benefited mostly the forward market (which activity rose by 75% between 1898 and 1899. This increased activity was concentrated in foreign government debts (+60%) and, above all, private foreign securities (+150%). On the other hand, the decrease in the Parquet forward operations on the French rentes was not stopped, and the rise in its forward operations on private French securities was not much affected by either the 1893 or the 1898 laws, maybe because it always had dominated that market segment, either (overwhelmingly) for spot or (relatively) for forward operations.
These results suggest that neither the supporters of the Coulisse nor those of the Parquet were right: The Parquet didn't suffer much from the 1893 law, mostly because the Coulisse had already conquered most of the market it could pretend to satisfy (banks, institutional investors and brokers issuing and dealing in securities not -yet -definitively distributed in individual portfolios). On the other hand, the supporters of the Coulisse were wrong in pretending that transferring the control of the market to the Parquet would result in an overall decline of the market: the change affected the distribution between Coulisse and Parquet but didn'tapparently -stop the development of the market, which was rapid from 1898 to 1913.
Transaction costs
Commissions were usually lower on the Coulisse, at least for large transactions. The difference, nevertheless, was lower than argued by coulissiers, since they compared their commissions to the official maximum commissions set by the Parquet regulation rather than to the actual commissions, usually nearer from the minimum (50% of the official maximum)
that the Parquet tried to impose to its members (with frequent enforcement problems, as the CAC archives testify). Furthermore, the 1898 reform led to official maximum commissions being halved, which put the Parquet on a footing similar to the Coulisse.
A major reason for the low commissions on the Coulisse is the fact its members acted also on their own account as counterparty, something forbidden to Parquet members. Part of their profits then resulted from the spread between their bid and ask prices. Unfortunately, these spreads have not been registered by the press, and -maybe in order to hide the dual capacity of the coulissiers to the private investors -the prices for securities listed on the Coulisse were always published as if they were pure "equilibrium" prices. We use the Roll (1984) One must consider that the Coulisse provided a higher immediacy, since on many securities its members were willing to buy or sell at any moment, when, after the opening fixing, Parquet members, as pure brokers, had to wait for a colleague to post an opposite order during the continuous auction. Furthermore, the Parquet was open only two hours a day, when the Coulisse opened much longer hours. The important advantage of immediacy had a price, which the spread certainly measures to some extent.
In a perfectly competitive and transparent market in which all agents have access to the same information, the spread must correspond only to their non-informational costs. An informed operator with dual capacity and no disclosure obligations can impose margins higher than these costs only in a situation of both opaqueness and asymmetric information. The Roll measure estimates realized spreads based on the covariance of past prices. His model makes strong hypotheses on the independence and random walk of past prices, and is more restrictive than more recent models (Glosten, 1987; Roomans, 1993) .
Nevertheless, these models require more information (on volumes in particular) that are not available in our historical setting.
We built portfolios corresponding to the various segments of the Paris stock market: not only the Parquet and the Coulisse, but their different sections, in order to compare properly average spreads. One methodological problem we faced is that, precisely because of the (changing) regulations, the Coulisse and the Parquet didn't list entirely comparable securities. This is why we built quite diversified portfolios (see appendix 3), totalling respectively 51, 51 and 38 securities for the Coulisse in 1892, 1894 and 1903, and 48, 50 and 47 for the Parquet (changes result from the availability of securities in some small segments at some dates). We focused particularly on cross-listed securities (those listed both on the Parquet and the Coulisse, something which supposedly should have not existed in 1892 and disappeared in 1903 but existed in both cases 51 ). For these securities (which represent above a third of our total sample), any result will appear as particularly strong since no fixed effect of the security can explain differences between the markets and affect the results. Furthermore, in order to facilitate the comparison between years, we also included as frequently as possible the same securities in the portfolios of consecutive years. We were able to include at least 75% of identical securities, which also reinforce our results.
We collected weekly prices for these securities and calculated the spreads for each security (some spreads could not be calculated because the co-variances were positive); we averaged these spreads for various portfolios, built on a combination of the market were the securities were listed (Parquet, Coulisse, or both), the type of security (bonds or stocks), the nationality of the issuer (French or foreign), the type of operation (forward or spot). The spreads on the Parquet are regularly lower than the Coulisse's ones, reflecting the differences in the trading systems. According to Pagano-Roell (1996) , the transparent market run by pure brokers with starting fixing and continuous auction produces tighter spreads; the opaque market run by informed dual capacity operators gives higher spreads, reflecting the rents coulissiers could extract from their superior information in an opaque market.
Despite the fact that all segments were not represented, the results of the diachronical analysis are quite clear (figure 2): in the Parisian market as a whole, spreads rose after 1893 (by 35% on average) and decline after 1898 (by 45%). The increase in the spread of the Coulisse was markedly higher than the one in the Parquet. This suggest that the 1893 move gave to coulissiers the opportunity to increase their spreads, thanks to their capacity to provide immediacy to a larger number of securities and their ability in using their private information in a more opaque market: in practice, the coulissiers were allowed to trade in all the securities without any juridical uncertainty. The increase in 1894 Coulisse's spreads were markedly strong in the spot and forward prices of single listed French and foreign shares. For these segments, the lack of competition allowed the coulissiers to wider more their spreads than on cross-listed securities 52 . In 1898 by contrast, the re-regulation imposed a reduction in spreads, which was particularly strong in the Parquet, mainly thanks to the consolidation of the order flow in a transparent market 53 .
If this hypothesis is true, spreads should be higher on average on the Coulisse, especially for cross-listed securities. This is clearly the case for most of our portfolios, but not true systematically (which may result from the small size of the portfolios).
52 On the other hand, the Couliss's spreads on cross-listed foreign bonds did not change much, which is not surprising since they were already traded by the coulissiers in 1892 and remained submitted to the competition of the Parquet in 1894. 53 Note that the increase in spreads should not result from the introduction of the tax, which was ultimately paid by the clients, not the intermediaries; in any case, the tax remained in place in 1903, when spreads fell. The results confirm our hypothesis (table 3) : spreads are significantly higher in 1894 (and much higher: one average more than one percentage point higher, or 50% higher), and they are also significantly higher on the Coulisse (almost by the same amount). Furthermore, as one may find reassuring, they are higher for stocks than for bonds (also by a similar amount). 
Financial integration
The next step in this work entails measuring the degree of integration of the two markets. For that purpose, we study the co-integration of various portfolios for the Parquet and the Coulisse and test for Granger causality between these series. This is necessary in order to understand better the relationship between the two markets. As Hasbrouck (1995) put it, a market might have large spreads and a relatively slow price-adjustment, but if innovations in this market cause reactions in another market where spreads are smaller and adjustment more rapid, the first market can still be understood as informationally dominant. In our case, this would may suggest that the Coulisse may be the most efficient (informationally) despite having larger spreads.
We built portfolios for six segments of the market, and price indices for each portfolio; we calculated returns for these portfolios. Unit roots tests on the indices (in logs) showed that all indices were non-stationary and first order integrated. This allowed us to test for cointegration using the Engle- Granger (1987) test. Results are given in table 4. Unsurprisingly, cointegration is more frequent for cross-listed securities, since the same securities appear in both markets so that direct arbitrage is possible. It is also higher for securities traded on the more active forward market.
In order to apprehend whether one of the markets is dominant and influences the other, we tested for Granger (1969) causality using the returns on our indices. Results are reported in Engel-Granger (ADF) *,**,*** significant at 10% (-2,58), 5% (-2,89) or 1% (-3,51) .
The table provides the tests for cointegration (H0: absence of cointegration) between indices of two portfolios of securities in the same market segment traded on the Parquet and the Parquet. in the short term, it probably contributed to the speculative bubble on the gold mines which ended with the 1895 crash; after that episode, transactions stagnated until the 1898 reform.
Furthermore, the 1893 reform imposed substantial costs on investors: it allowed the Coulisse to enlarge its spreads, increasing transaction costs. By contrast, the 1898 reform look like mostly beneficial: transaction costs declined substantially thanks both to price controls on the Parquet (to a small extent) and (mostly) from the lower spreads on the now dominant transparent market. Immediacy was still available on the Coulisse for a number of securities, but most investors exchanged some immediacy for lower costs. Most importantly, the 1898 reform didn't provoke a decline in the market as a whole, which continued growing up to 
